eratives has increased in most input and product markets over the past three decades
Supply Cooperatives (Table 2) . Kraenzle, Street, and Richardson report that cooperatives have increased their cheese, 10 percent of the ice cream, 17 percent of the frozen product mix, and 15 percent of the bulk condensed milk (Stafford and Roof, Generally, the overall decline in the number pp IV-V) of farmer cooperatives of all types reflects, in part, a continuing reorganization in the structure of agriculture. The reduction is generally ated with size and change in size of firms have The organization of the U.S. food system traditionally been treated by economists using has changed dramatically, and this changing the neo-classical average and marginal cost system has implications for the growth of curves as the theoretical tool (Renborg) . The farmer cooperatives. A review of the agriculshortcomings of this approach are numerous. tural economy over the past two decades illus-First, the theory assumes that the goal of the trates this point. The 1970's decade is widely firm is to maximize profits. Thus, the theory recognized as the golden decade for agricul-removes from any analysis the goal formuture. During this decade, agricultural co-lation process of management, and, to the exoperatives grew fewer in number and larger tent the theory assumes a certain outcome, it in size; however, farmer cooperatives exdoes not account for risk associated with the perienced more public scrutiny during this growth process of the firm over time. Another period than at any other time in their recent critique of neo-classical theory is that it is inhistory. Less than favorable public opinion sufficient as a planning instrument for the toward a few large regional and national co-manager who wants to direct firm growth. operatives and legal cases involving coopThe received theory is at a level of abstraction eratives allegedly performing unfair trade such that practical application of its use is practices have raised questions concerning unlikely. Lastly, the neo-classical theory is the limited antitrust exemption given to farmstatic: it describes efficient cost situations for er cooperatives (Johnson and Jesse, Mueller, a firm at a given state (size), as opposed to 1979). In more recent years, the agricultural costs associated with a firm's growth (dynamic). recession which started in 1981 has placed
These and other limitations of neo-classical severe constraints on the growth of farmer economic theory, as it relates to firm growth, cooperatives. This reduced level of growth has have motivated economists to extend the neoresulted in problems related to member loyalty, classical approach in the area of planning for financial stress, and market access. Given this growth. Baumol and Williamson developed optipoor economic performance, this paper seeks mal permanent growth rate models for an into address theoretically and empirically the finite planning period under certainty, and growth of farmer cooperatives.
Richardson employed a model of optimal growth Knutson correctly pointed out that the queswhich determines the point where marginal protion of how large cooperatives should be alfit from added investments in the firm equals lowed to get is "inherently a judgment quesmarginal cost of financial capital. Although tion." A fundamental question in this public these theories are of the level of abstraction debate is: What is firm growth? Firm growth where their practical use to firm managers may is an increment in firm size. Size is a static be limited, these models do, however, incorconcept; growth, on the other hand, implies porate a dynamic approach to the firm growth change in size. But size can be characterized process. by many aspects of the firm-sales, assets, Penrose developed a comprehensive theory employees, number of plants, etc. It is also of firm growth and evaluated several qualwidely recognized that firm growth may be initative aspects of growth not only against the ternal or external. Internal growth includes changes created by the firm's own activities, but adjustments of operations to help accomplish also against the effect of changes external to the selected strategies by constructing new facilfirm and beyond its control. Her model accounts ities, increasing membership or business for firm growth over time. She departs from the volume, adding services, or developing marneo-classical theory of the firm by assuming that kets. External growth, on the other hand, inthe amount of growth per unit of time, and the cludes mergers, consolidations, acquisitions, growth rate, is limited. Penrose rejects the and joint ventures.
existence of an "optimal" firm size. She argues that inducements to growth stem from unused industrial organization theory. He asserts growth opportunities outside and inside the that the firm's growth rate is a joint function firm. Penrose assumes a growth cost function of the firm's rate of profit and the firm's that is concave to the origin. Thus, the firm's market share. Marcus reasoned that a large rate of growth is hindered by growth costs, market share will retard the firm's growth stemming from the difficulties management enrate because as the market share of the firm counters in planning and organizing the growth increases, the distinction between firm and inprocess.
dustry (monopoly) becomes indistinguishable, Industrial organization focuses primarily on and the firm has a greater impact on market market organization and economic performprices and terms of trade. Thus, the large firm ance (Bain, Scherer) . The basic industrial may develop other objectives (i.e., mainteorganization paradigm holds that the structure nance of market share) rather than maximiof a market influences the conduct of firms zation of growth potential. Moreover, larger which in turn influences the resulting market firms are more likely to consider antitrust in performance. Market performance is also intheir firm's goal setting process. Marcus teractive with the existing behavior and struchypothesizes that the stimulant effects of ture of the market. Much public debate and, higher firm profit rates upon firm growth are thus, demand for economic information concerns balanced by the depressant effects of possible identification of relationships between the antitrust action. structure of a market and its resulting economic performance. As a result, a great deal of
The Growth of Farmer Cooperatives: economic research has dealt with firm size and Empirical Studies resulting economic performance (growth). However, the evidence, largely coming from
Research relevant to growth of agricultural English economists, suggests that there is no cooperatives is limited. Mueller (1962) perrelationship between the size of the firm and the formed a comprehensive study of overall coopmean growth rate of the firm (Kalecki, Hart, erative merger activity, its impact on coSimon and Bonini). This statistical relationship operative growth, the general economic forces is known as the Gibrat's Law or the law of prounderlying it, and the unique problems coopportionate effect (Kalecki) . Gibrat's Law states eratives face when growth is by external that the probability of a given firm's growing x means (mergers). He found that between 1945 percent is independent of the size of that firm.
and 1955 nearly one-half of the 102 large dairy In other words, the probability of a large firm cooperatives in his study grew primarily by growing at a rate of 10 percent per year is no merger and acquisition. Mueller concluded different from the probability of a small firm that cooperatives involved in merger activity growing at the same rate per year. Koch notes grew at a faster rate during this time period that "Gibrat's Law also implies that the than cooperatives which primarily depended variances of the growth rates of various size on internal expansion. Mueller reasoned that classes of firms should be equal" (p. 162).
if growth is a measure of a cooperative's sucHymer and Pashingian provide evidence from cess, then merging cooperatives are more sucthe American economy relative to firm size and cessful than those which rely on internal firm growth rates. This study suggests that size growth exclusively. Garoyan and Cramer of firm has no systematic effect on the firm's found that between 1940 and 1964 external growth rate. However, contrary to Gibrat's growth accounted for only 13 percent of coLaw, their evidence indicates that the varioperative growth, increasing the average size ability of firm growth rates decreases as firm of all cooperatives by approximately seven size increases.
percent over the 25-year period. They conTwo basic relationships in industrial cluded that cooperatives rely primarily on inorganization theory: (1) the mean firm profit ternal rather than external means of growth. rate is positively related to firm size and (2) The standard method of measuring the contrithe rate of firm growth is positively related to bution of mergers to firm growth uses total the rate of firm profitability, provide a logical assets as an indication of firm size. Total asset contradiction to Gibrat's Law. If the above growth of acquiring firms during a given two statements are true, then it follows that period is divided by estimated total assets of larger firms should grow faster than smaller acquired firms to give a first approximation of firms. Marcus provides an explanation as to the contribution of mergers to firm growth. why the empirical results support Gibrat's Industrial organization theory provides a Law, but departs from the logical extension of framework for further examination of firm growth. By distinguishing between structural function of one's philosophical (ideological) elements and performance dimensions of position. The cooperative movement in the firms, econometric models can be specified to:
United States shares at least three rationales: 1) identify factors associated with firm growth (1) competitive yardstick, (2) supply manageand 2) examine the relationship between firm ment (coordination), and (3) social school of size and firm growth. Babb measured growth thought. Rather than suggest a prescribed of relatively small firms in the cheese, grain, role for farmer cooperatives, I would like to and farm supply industries and the factors afdescribe a set of problems cooperatives can fecting their growth. Using ordinary least potentially address given the three underlysquares, Babb's model regressed the growth ing rationales for cooperative existence. The rates in total sales and assets of agribusiness emphasis is not on prescribing a set of solufirms and cooperatives as a function of time tions to problems, but rather on identifying period (1950, 1960, 1970, 1980) , the state in characteristics of problems and exploring which the firm was located, business organizapotential applications for farmer cooperatives tion, and total sales or assets as a measure of given a changing agricultural economy. firm size. These factors accounted for less
The most common and widely accepted rathan half (40%) of the variation in firm growth tionale for farmer cooperatives in the U.S. is rates during 1950-1980. Chen, Babb, and  the competitive yardstick school of thought. Schrader compared the growth of large coop-
The competitive yardstick school views cooperatives to proprietary firms in the U.S. food eratives as a method of addressing the pro industry by regressing firm growth (sales and lems associated with imperfectly competitive assets) against selected independent variables market structures. Thu, this school recogsuch as profitability, diversification, mergers, nizes the existence of cooperatives only under advertising, and firm size. This study was conditions of market failure. completed during a time period (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) when the primary industry (agriculture) was Two critical problems facing producers at experiencing growth in output. Christy exthe first-handler level that are related to maramined the growth rates of cooperatives in ket failure have implications for the role of cothree southern states during 1981-84. He operatives. The first problem deals with examined the relationship between firm size, market power and the associated issues of measured in terms of total assets and total buyer oligopoly and price discovery. Insales, and the growth rates of agricultural cocreased economic concentration is a trend operatives in the states of Alabama, occurring across most food markets, parLouisiana, and Mississippi. The coefficients ticularly at the producer and first-buyer level. for both total assets and total sales were not This growth in buyer concentration is directly significant at the five percent level, thus makrelated to the price discovery and determinaing it possible to reject the hypothesis that tion processes in agricultural markets. Clearly, larger cooperative firms grow at a faster rate the exchange between producer and buyer than do smaller firms. Moreover, the coeffiover time is being replaced by contractual arcients carried negative signs which suggests rangements as opposed to open market (price that there is an inverse relationship between guided) transactions. If pricing efficiency in firm size and firm growth among agricultural food markets is determined by how well prices cooperatives in the study area and during the function in these roles, then for agricultural time period of analysis. These results are conmarkets, performance is lowered under condisistent with Chen, Babb, and Schrader, sugtions of contractual exchange. The concentragesting that firm size has little effect on tion of these markets results in sub-optimal farmer cooperative growth rates during economic performance that results in market periods of increasing or decreasing economic failure. What then is the role of farmer coactivity within the agricultural sector. These operatives, given this problem? The need for empirical studies, although limited in scope, farmers to gain market power has been the suggest that the growth rate of cooperatives major rationale for the existence and support corresponds to the law of proportionate effect.
of farmer cooperatives. This role for farmer cooperatives continues to receive widespread THE ROLE(S) OF FARMER support except for the cases of illegal prac-COOPERATIVES tices on the part of farmer cooperatives as set out in the Capper-Volstead Act. Within some The role(s) of farmer cooperatives in the commodity markets, cooperatives have re-U.S. food, fuel, and fiber systems is largely a ceived a major share of the volume marketed (i.e., dairy). But does this growth in cooperaages and associated unstable prices are chartive size and market share provide coacteristic of market economies. Shaffer and operatives with too much market power?
Staatz argue that the coordination problem Torgenson referred to Galbraith, who identiarises because: fled in cooperatives several structural defi-... decisions to produce a flow of prodciencies which limit their market power: (1) ucts and sources for future periods are cooperatives are a loose association of inmade over time by many different acdividuals; (2) they rarely include all the protors, who are uncertain about the future ducers of a product; (3) they cannot control the demand and supply of these products production of members; and (4) they have less and services. Although equating marthan absolute control over the decision to sell.
ginal costs with marginal revenue maxiTherefore, it seems very unlikely that coopermizes profit, equating marginal revenue atives can attain an excessive level of market when expectations are as uncertain as a power. They can make use of various practices random number table will produce a ranwhich are available to private market firms in dom distribution of profits and a random attaining market power, but since they cannot allocation of resources. (p. 53) control individual members' production deciThey point out that the coordination problem sions, cooperatives do not possess the ability ot aute in f systems because of the to enhance prices much differently from outmosta uncerta ity in production due to added uncertainty in production due to comes dictated by market fundamentals. weather and biological processes and because The second problem facing producers of the competitive structure of portions of the relates to the availability and quality of input, processing, and distribution segments market information. Information exhibits a of the system. set of characteristics that invalidates the usefulness of its optimal allocation by markets.
e ro o armr cperis in syste an Information possesses the characteristics of a coordination problems in our food system can public good. The concentration of markets furbest be observ d between individl ther contributes to the uncertainty of proo oodnato and between the total ducers, and, as industrial concentration consupply and total demand for commodities for industries at each step in the productiontinues to occur in food markets, the issue of idustries at each step in the productionprivate ownership of information versus the public's right to know becomes more critical.
(Shaffer and Staatz). The federal statistical budget was reduced by
Cooperatives serving as institutions of 20 percent in real terms between 1980 and market coordination are limited by several 1983. The budget cuts in federal statistics factors. First, the comprehensive theory of altered the data production efforts of the economic coordination is not developed. SecUnited States Department of Agriculture, ond, the approach assumes market coordinaStatistical Reporting Service (SRS), in at least tion is the major problem within the food three ways: (1) approximately 27 agriculturalsystem. How do we reconcile the benefits of related and crop reports were eliminated, (2) improved market coordination against insome state level estimates were discontinued, creased levels of market power and the potenand (3) data series were eliminated for several tial unequitable distribution of property fruit and vegetable crops (Gardner) . Thus, the rights? public data and information output related to
The third ideology which supports the the producer and first-handler level in the cooperative movement within U.S. agriculmarket have been reduced. This situation preture places equal, if not greater, emphasis on sents a real opportunity for farmer cooperasocial aspects of development (human and tives to develop a role in providing farmers community) as on the economic results. The with the access to market information and changes in the agricultural sector have more provision of management software and tremendous impacts on rural communities. services.
Segments of our rural communities are oftenThe second major rationale for farmer cooptimes bypassed by economic growth, rapid eratives rests on the premise of improving the changes in technology, and public policies. coordination of supply with demand for farm These individuals are largely poor and commodities to achieve prices more consistent powerless. Williams describes such inwith costs of production (Shaffer and Staatz) . dividuals as likely members of Emerging The problem of market surpluses and shortCooperatives:
Emerging Cooperatives are usually years. The growth in cooperative numbers referred to as a group having a high perand members peaked during the 1960's; since cent of low-income members. These are that time their decline has paralleled the dethe cooperatives organized and managed dine in the number of U. cooperatives were discussed. Each rationale The use of the cooperative in community links cooperatives to a critical problem within economic development is confronted by many the U.S. food system. The competitive yardconstraints. Leadership and managerial abilstick school of thought is most relevant to ities needed to operate these institutions are problems associated with market failure. The often lacking among the rural poor. Capital supply management school views vertical needed to operate these institutions is scarce.
coordination as the primary problem with Lastly, the multiple objectives of these coopagricultural markets, and the social school aderatives makes it difficult to balance tradeoffs vocates the application of cooperative busibetween competing members' interests.
ness organization in solving social and human CONCLUSIONS development problems in rural areas. The role(s) of farmer cooperatives, it was shown, Farmer cooperatives have legally operated has broader application than simply market within U.S. agricultural markets for over 50 failure considerations.
